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Johnston: 48th Highlanders in Sicily

The 48th Highlanders in Sicily
Account by Lieutenant-Colonel I.S. Johnston, Officer
Commanding 48 Highlanders given on 14 August 1943 at the
Battalion Rest Area near SCORDIA

A

s far as we are concerned the Sicilian
campaign which ended for 1 Canadian
Division about five or six weeks ago, commenced
on Easter Sunday, 25 April 1943, when our
Church Parade was cancelled by Brigade and
a conference of battalion commanders was
called. We were warned for special training
in an unknown place and were told that the
battalions would revert to the old four rifle
company establishment and that we would
generally prepare for operations. Previous to
this we had already commenced mobilization.
We then spent another week at EASTBOURNE
during which time we formed the fourth rifle
company, disposed of extra equipment, cleared
out all category men and doubtful physical
cases, and completely overhauled equipment.
We then went to INVERARY where we trained on
Combined Operations without any particular type
of country in view, for one week. From INVERARY
we went to AUCHINLECK where we completed
re-equipment and commenced receiving special
equipment such as pack saddles, anti-malarial
equipment, mosquito nets, light bicycles, etc.
We still had no idea of where we were going.
While still at AUCHINLECK we sent away all
Top left and right: Convoy en route to Sicily by Major
William Abernethy Ogilvie
CWM AN 19710261-4484 & AN 19710261-4483

men over 40 years of age (about 30) and these
were replaced by younger reinforcements. It is
an interesting fact that at that late date we had
a very large turnover of personnel and received
quite a number of untrained men. It was at this
stage that we received our first reinforcements
most of whom came from other regiments and
divisions. At AUCHINLECK we took part in
exercise WETSHOD which involved spending
five days on board HMS GLENGYLE. During
this exercise a landing on a shallow beach based
on actual operations was carried out. After
WETSHOD I was called to LONDON and briefed
on the operation which we have just completed.
Preparations continued in AUCHINLECK and
about 10 June the first group of troops with
vehicles were dispatched to LIVERPOOL,
MANCHESTER and GLASGOW. The battalion
itself left AUCHINLECK on 13 June after having
been told that it was going off on an exercise and
we embarked on M.V. DERBYSHIRE lying in the
GAIRLOCH on the same day. About five days later
we participated in Exercise STYMIE I. We laid off
ARRAN for several days and then returned up the
RIVER CLYDE to the TAIL OF THE BANK and
stayed there for about another week. We actually
set sail for the operation on 28 June.
During the actual landing the 48 Highlanders
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Vehicles of the 1st Canadian Division being hauled up from the beach near Pachino, Sicily, 10 July 1943.

were able to pull off this sandbar and attempted
another landing on the left of ROGER GREEN I
where we again touched down but again found
that we were on a reef. We tried to pull ourselves
off this reef and tried for ROGER RED beach and
saw that other LCIs were having equal difficulty
there. We had some strong swimmers carry a
line into shore for the men to pull themselves
along but these became fouled with two Landing
Craft Mechanizeds that had broken down near
the beach. Eventually we hailed some passing
LCAs and DUKWs and transferred the troops to
them and we were carried over the deep water
to the beach itself.
There was no small arms fire on the beach during
all this delay and we saw only two shells land in
the water anywhere near us. After the landing
we had a little difficulty correlating the ground
with our ideas gained from maps, models and
pictures. We gained our first objective without
contacting any enemy. Our only difficulty lay in
crossing the sand dunes with the mortar and
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were detailed to act as reserve battalion for 1 CIB.
At about noon 9 July as we were passing MALTA
a heavy sea blew up and we doubted whether the
operation would come off. One company of the
Hastings & Prince Edward Regiment together
with 40 Royal Marine Commandos were the
assault troops and left the DERBYSHIRE on
time having loaded into landing craft at the davit
heads. Landing Craft Infantries and Landing
Craft Assaults then came alongside to take off this
battalion and certain other troops. Owing to the
heavy swell these craft had difficulty in coming
alongside and actually were not fully loaded by
the time that we were supposed to touch down
at the beach. However, when we were completely
loaded we reported to the GLENGYLE at about
dawn and brigade held us up for about an hour
before we were ordered in as apparently the
assaulting battalions had been equally delayed.
We were ordered to land on ROGER GREEN I
beach and we directed the Navy on to that point
and attempted to land on the extreme right of that
beach but we touched down on the sandbar. We
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wireless handcarts. We remained on our objective
that night during which we were entertained by
a fireworks display when the enemy attempted
to bomb beaches and harbour from the air.
Intentionally or otherwise they dropped one
bomb in ‘D’ Company area but without causing
any casualties.
On the following day (11 July) we made for
BURGIO which we reached without encountering
the enemy and where Lieutenant-General Sir
Oliver Leese, General Officer Commanding 30
Corps, paid us a visit. From there we received
orders to march to ROSOLINI which we entered
with the Italians who surrendered to the tune
of 45 PWs. We spent a very uncomfortable
night in the town due to the town being on fire
in many places coupled with a horrible stench
which seemed to pervade everywhere and on
top of this it had turned quite cold. During
that same night the Royal Canadian Regiment
passed through us on vehicles followed by the
Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment and then
ourselves leaving at about 0500 hours, 12 July.
We had no vehicles for this march having loaned
all of ours to the Royal Canadian Regiment. All
that day (12 July) we marched to the area of
MODICA. Our heat casualties during this march
were severe and we had a very large number of
stragglers, but we found a fairly cool area with
water where we rested until about midnight and

then continued to march on to GIARRATANIA.
Here we spent the night and the surrounding hills
to take up positions. Altogether we were in the
GIARRATANIA area for about three days and it
was here on 14 July that General Sir Bernard L.
Montgomery gave his personal talk to the Royal
Canadian Regiment and 48 Highlanders on a
combined parade.
On the night of the 15 July we left GIARRANTANIA
at about 2400 hours and moved just south of
VIZZINI where the 51 (Highland) Division had
been halted. We were thereupon turned off the
road on orders from the Brigade and rested in a
field. The following morning (16 July) at first light
we passed through the 51 (Highland) Division and
were then in occupation of VIZZINI, preceded by
the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment. Up
to this point we had had no fighting, although we
did have some contact with the Italians who had
packed up in all cases. It was at VIZZINI that we
heard for the first time of any troops contacting
Germans. At the next town, GRAMMICHELE, the
Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment ran into
some definite trouble but they were able to clear
the enemy from the forward reaches of the town
by 1200 hours. I was called upon by the Brigade
commander to furnish a recce patrol and carriers
to enter GRAMMICHELE and see if it was entirely
cleared of enemy. Since our carriers had gone
down with the CITY OF VENICE, I borrowed

German prisoners captured by Canadian troops near Valguarnera, 17 July 1943.
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A Canadian patrol makes its way through the streets of Valguarnera, 19 July 1943.

mines, so we went back to the road and moved
at a much quicker pace. At about 2400 hours we
were ordered not to enter the town but to bivouac
on the side of the road. However, at 0200 hours,
17 July, we received instructions to occupy the
town before daylight. In the meantime the tanks
and certain other vehicles had joined us and we
entered the town of CALTEGIRONE at about 0400
hours without opposition. That day (17 July) we
moved on through SAN MICHEL and PIAZZA
ARMERINA towards VALGUERNERA embussed.
It must be pointed out that at this stage of the
campaign transport was very scarce and every
available vehicle was used to carry troops. When
the occasion demanded it some rode on anti-tank
guns, Sherman tanks, even the water-wagon
and various odd Italian transport which we had
picked up on the way. This involved bringing
ammunition and other important supplies
forward to one dump and leaving as many as
three to four dumps on the route according to
the priority of equipment.
South of VALGUERNERA a right flanking
movement was attempted at which the Royal
Canadian Regiment and Hastings and Prince
Edward Regiment fanned well out on the
high ground to the east of the town. The 48
Highlanders also moved into the high ground
about two miles east of the main road where we
took up position opposite a ridge from which the
enemy were able to observe our movements and
position and thereby mortar us. There positions
had been taken up shortly after dawn (18 July)
and in the afternoon we were ordered to patrol
the high ground before us to determine the extent
of the enemy’s positions. Two platoons from ‘D’
Company were sent forward as fighting patrols
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three carriers from the Brigade Support Group
(Saskatoon Light Infantry) using their drivers
under the command of one of our officers,
Lieutenant McLaughlin, with the balance of the
crew coming from ‘B’ Company. This patrol was
to report back by 1400 hours and it did reporting
the town clear. In the meantime orders had come
through from the General Officer Commanding of
the Division to advance by 1400 hours. We did so
with a section of carriers leading, a squadron of
tanks from 12 Canadian Tank Regiment (Three
Rivers Regiment) carrying a company of infantry,
a platoon of engineers, together with a detachment
of anti-tank guns and the remainder of battalion
embussed on motor transport. Because the
supporting arms had all been involved in the
Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment’s show,
we could not get this column moving until 1500
hours by which time no Forward Observation
Officers or engineers had reported. We lead off
with the same three carriers and crews that
had done the recce. When about two miles out
of GRAMMICHELE the leading carrier in which
Lieutenant McLaughlin was riding came across
a burned-out enemy vehicle which it by-passed,
thereby touching the soft shoulder at the side of
the road, passed over an enemy mine and blew
up. Before the engineers had evidently reported,
our own pioneers had been sent forward with this
detachment to deal with further enemy mines.
They, together with the engineers, who had arrived
by this time, reported the road cratered ahead
with probable mines. The battalion thereupon
debussed and moved across country on either
side of the road and by sunset were still several
miles from CALTEGIRONE, our objective. The
engineers who had been left behind on the road
then caught up with us and reported no further

Photo by Jack H. Smith, NAC PA 163671
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to this ridge where they found quite a number
of enemy positions and which they were able to
attack with considerable success and drove the
enemy from the area. These two patrols suffered
comparatively light casualties in these actions.
While in the VALGUERNERA area we heard that
ENNA had fallen and that our attack was shifted
to the axis due north of us. 48 Highlanders were
ordered to approach ASSORO by the morning of
19 July across country on either side of the road
to STAZIONE di DITTAINO, which we did, moving
on the high ground wherever possible. Along this
route we encountered minor resistance which we
overcame without casualties. As we were about to
wheel to the left on the road to ASSORO we were
halted and the Royal Canadian Regiment passed
through us. We then took up position on the high
ground south of the railway track which runs
south of ASSORO from west to east. That night
the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment passed
through us and entered the town of ASSORO
where they were cut off.
The following afternoon (20 July), leaving ‘A’
and ‘C’ Companies as a firm base, ‘D’ and ‘B’
Companies were sent forward toward ASSORO.
No.17 platoon came under fire on the right
of the road after which numbers 16 and 18
platoons eventually followed by 17 platoon
found a covered line of approach near the power
station. By nightfall both companies went out of
wireless communication but were subsequently
found to be on top of the hill covering the
approaches to ASSORO and were brought back
into communication with each other. At dawn
(21 July) ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies were able to
clear the enemy from this hill thus permitting
the engineers to fill in a road crater which had
prevented the supporting arms from getting their

transport forward. During this operation both
companies suffered casualties. When the hill
was cleared ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies and battalion
headquarters were able to push forward and
the battalion took up position on the main
road west of ASSORO where it was mortared
and shelled by the enemy throughout the day.
Because of this no supporting arms could reach
the battalion. By nightfall (21 July) the battalion
was concentrated and prepared to move forward
to the road junction north of ASSORO and east of
LEONFORTE in square 3594. As it prepared to
leave for this road junction it came under heavy
shelling and ‘D’ and ‘B’ Companies again suffered
casualties. After some confusion the battalion
assembled on the road and moved in the order
- ‘D’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘A’ Companies. ‘D’ Company
on reaching the road junction reported it clear
and ‘B’ Company thereupon moved forward and
through ‘D’ Company to take up its position.
When this occurred both companies came under
heavy machine gun fire. By nightfall (22 July)
it was difficult to estimate the numbers and
positions held by the platoons of the enemy and
there was some confusion as to the positions held
by the platoons of these companies. Accordingly
both companies were ordered to withdraw which
they did reporting the presence of at least three
tanks in hull down positions and machine guns
and infantry in the area. During these actions the
18 sets of both companies had failed. Captain
Lynn was the last to withdraw from his company
position and a party of men who went back to find
him reported that the enemy were withdrawing.
Accordingly the battalion moved into the area
and took up its positions at about first light (23
July). Throughout the day and that night we were
shelled and mortared in these positions without
casualties and on the following day (24 July) we
were relieved by the Edmonton Regiment and

A Sherman tank from a Canadian armoured regiment moves across a dusty Sicilian plateau, 3 August 1943.

61
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003

5

Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 3, Art. 5

A 3-inch mortar crew firing on enemy positions north of Nissoria, 28 July 1943.

proceeded on foot behind the Royal Canadian
Regiment in the direction of NISSORIA. The plan
was that the Royal Canadian Regiment should
move with their left flank on the road and the 48
Highlanders should move astride the road behind
them. The Royal Canadian Regiment contacted
the enemy sitting on the ridge east of NISSORIA.
The 48 Highlanders were ordered into a position
on the high ground west of this town and that
night the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment
were ordered to pass through to take the ridge
where the Royal Canadian Regiment had been
held up. Both these battalions lost contact with
each other and suffered heavy casualties. It was
accordingly planned to put the 48 Highlanders
into the attack with a barrage supplied by
concentrations from Divisional artillery support
at 1800 hours the following day (25 July).
During the morning of 25 July the position
in front of us seemed quiet and a troop of 4
Canadian Recce Regiment (4 Princess Louise
Dragoon Guards) was able to pass through the
town and onto the ridge without contacting the
enemy. It was accordingly felt that the enemy
had withdrawn. Two patrols were sent out from
‘C’ Company and they reported back at 1300
hours that they had found enemy tanks and an
88 mm gun on this position. It was too late at
this time to lay on an artillery barrage. The Royal
Canadian Regiment and Hastings and Prince
Edward Regiment had both reported the enemy
on the face of the ridge in caves. Medium machine
gun fire from the Brigade Support Group was
thereupon arranged together with artillery

concentrations and this was directed towards
the caves. The battalion was ordered to attack at
1800 hours. In view of the condition of the other
two battalions, the Royal Canadian Regiment
and Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, the
brigade commander ordered that we attack on
a one company frontage and, as success was
obtained, the other companies were withheld to
form a firm base against possible counterattack.
It was then decided to attack up a defile on the
left of the position with ‘D’ Company leading who
were to wheel out and take the high ground to
the north of the feature which was thought to
command it. This company was to be followed
by ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘A’ Companies who were to wheel
to the right and pass through each other thereby
allowing ‘A’ Company to lay south of the position.
The attack went in as ordered with apparently
little opposition. During the commencement of
the attack the companies were shelled in the
forming up areas but without casualties. ‘D’
Company reported themselves on their objective
and ‘B’ Company was then launched in its attack,
followed by ‘C’ Company. After ‘C’ Company
had gone into the attack ‘D’ Company reported
heavy opposition on reaching their objective. All
of this opposition was found to be on the top
and reverse slopes of this feature and not on
the forward slopes as reported by the other two
battalions. The artillery concentrations were to
be called down by 18 sets from battalion HQ.
This communication failed so the artillery fired
a second concentration on a time plan previously
agreed upon in the event of such a failure
occurring. This turned out to be too early as ‘D’
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Company had not yet reported on its objective.
It was then possible to arrange for artillery fire,
as originally planned, to support ‘B’ Company
but the concentration in support of ‘C’ was laid
on twice. ‘C’ Company failed to take the route
following ‘D’ and ‘B’ Companies so did not make
contact with ‘B’ Company. After nightfall ‘D’ and
‘B’ Companies were both out of communication
with battalion HQ. They had failed to attack their
objectives and found their positions untenable
and they both withdrew. ‘C’ Company in the
meantime had proceeded slowly and laid up after
being overtaken by darkness until about midnight
when they attacked towards their objective. They
found the position closely held by enemy tanks
in hull down positions and by other machine
gun fire. At about 0200 hours 26 July, Captain
Whitelaw, Officer Commanding ‘C’ Company,
reported to battalion HQ and with the consent of
the brigade commander was allowed to withdraw
with little, if any, casualties. The battalion then
took up its original defensive position where it
remained during the next two days.

Photo by Jack H. Smith, NAC PA 168706

After AGIRA had been taken (29 July), the
battalion was ordered on 30 July to move forward
towards REGALBUTO. During the early hours of
the morning we moved through NISSORIA and
AGIRA embussed. We debussed east of AGIRA
and continued the march forward on foot. From a
forward observation post the brigade commander
gave orders for the battalion to take up a position
on a long ridge just west of the REGALBUTO
cemetery which was then in the occupation of
231 Brigade who were under command of 1
Canadian Division at this time. Since the town of
REGALBUTO was still in the hands of the enemy
this approach was across country and there was
no open road available over which to bring up
any supporting arms. On arrival on the position
it was found that two companies of the DORSETS
were still in possession of this feature and were in
contact with the enemy immediately to their front.
Shortly thereafter the two remaining companies
of the DORSETS who had been in possession of
the ridge north of REGALBUTO, were forced to
withdraw into our position. The 48 Highlanders
then took up position on the south and that
night the battalion was placed under command
231 Brigade but the message to this effect had

never reached me as battalion commander. That
evening (31 July) ‘C’ Company was in constant
contact with the enemy. Just before dark the
battalion received orders to send a strong fighting
patrol to the high ground about two to three miles
to the north and ‘D’ Company was dispatched
to take up this position and to be there before
dawn, 1 August. On arrival in this position ‘D’
Company found the east edge to be held by the
enemy supported by tanks who were on a low
plateau to the south of the ridge. Throughout the
day this company was in constant contact with
enemy snipers during which it suffered some
casualties. Throughout that same day ‘A’ and ‘C’
Companies had been in contact with the enemy
who had tanks in the town which engaged them
with medium machine guns and high explosive
fire. Although we still had no supporting arms
the enemy tanks did not actually come forward to
attack us in our positions. During the following
night (2 August) the enemy withdrew from the
town.

A bulldozer of the 1st Field Company, Royal
Canadian Engineers cuts a new road across the
Salso River near Regalbuto, 4 August 1943.
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On the morning of 3 August we sent a small
patrol into the town which they reported clear
of enemy and subsequently two companies of
the DORSETS took the town over. That same
evening the battalion was ordered to take up a
position on the same ridge that ‘D’ Company then
occupied and it did so being in position by first
light, 4 August. That afternoon the battalion was
ordered to send a strong patrol to the high ground
in square 6196 and another patrol forward to
RIVER SALSO. ‘A’ Company was accordingly
sent forward to this position and reached it at
about 2200 hours. At 0200 hours the following
morning (5 August) the battalion was ordered
to take up position on the ridge south of the
REGALBUTO - CARCACI road and to be in
position by 0700 hours, where we spent the night.
The following day (6 August) we received orders
to prepare to cross the RIVER SIMMETO and
together with the company commanders I spent
the day on a recce during which we contacted
78 Division who were on our Divisional right
flank at CARCACI. On the return trip our party
came under machine gun fire in the avoidance
of which our Jeep overturned into the ditch and
we were obliged to belly-crawl out of the area
thereby rendering us late for a brigade orders
group conference. The battalion was ordered to
send patrols to cross the RIVER SIMETO and to
be ready on a quarter of an hour’s notice to move
by transport or on foot to a forming up place and
to be prepared to form a bridgehead. At dawn (7
August) the battalion accordingly assembled in
the ‘A’ Company forward area and prepared to

move. On receipt of orders to do so the battalion
crossed the RIVER SALSO after dark, and by a
very difficult march route arrived in the forming
up area. The leader of our patrol which had been
sent forward reported that the enemy were still
on the other side of the RIVER SIMETO and had,
in fact, troops on the western bank. This patrol
was then sent back to cover the recce by the
engineer recce party and the engineers reported
that the approach to a bridge in the battalion
area was impossible. At 0700 hours the following
morning (7 August) the battalion commander
ordered another patrol to go out and on arrival
in the area of CARACI the 78 Division reported
that the enemy had withdrawn from the eastern
side of the river. Orders were then received,
having been brought personally by the Brigade
Major, Major G.E. Renison, to cross the river in
the area 1,000 yards north of the aqueduct. On
approaching the river the battalion was shelled
and suffered light casualties. The following night
(8 August) 78 Division attacked ADERNO with a
heavy barrage of which some shells landed in the
battalion area but caused no casualties. On the
following day (9 August) the Division was ordered
into Army reserve and on 12 August the battalion
in a brigade move proceeded to its present area
where we are now resting, re-organizing and
training for our next campaign.
The original of this document can be found at the National
Archives of Canada, RG 24 Volume 10880.
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Canadian soldiers clean up at the end of the Sicillian campaign, near Adrano, 18 August 1943.
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